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Abstract
We study a policy game between exporting and importing
countries in vertically linked industries. In a successive interna-
tional Cournot oligopoly, we let the governments in the importing
and exporting countries use tax instruments strategically to shift
rents up or down the vertical value-chain. We show that the
equilibrium outcome depends crucially on the relative degree of
competitiveness in the upstream and downstream parts of the
industry. With respect to national welfare, a more competitive
upstream industry may beneﬁt an exporting (upstream) coun-
try while harming an importing (downstream) country. On the
other hand, a more competitive downstream industry may harm
exporting countries.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Vertical linkages play an important role in international trade, partic-
ularly in markets where ﬁrms (and ultimately consumers) rely on key
intermediate inputs or raw materials that are supplied by dominant ex-
porters in one or a few countries. Trade in natural resources serves
as an obvious example. In a policy context, such cross-border verti-
cal linkages naturally lead to a conﬂict of interest between exporting
and importing countries. In the present paper, we consider the policy
interaction between exporting and importing countries in an industry
that is characterised by successive international oligopoly1:u p s t r e a m
oligopolist ﬁrms in one or more exporting countries supply a homoge-
neous good to downstream oligopolist ﬁr m si na ni m p o r t i n gc o u n t r y ,
where the end-user market is located.
Although our model structure is suﬃciently generic to ﬁtav a r i e t yo f
diﬀerent industries, an interesting — and particularly ﬁtting — example
of such an industry structure is the European market for natural gas.
The ongoing liberalisation of the market — through the implementation
of the so-called Gas Directive2 — means that the market structure is
increasingly taking the shape of a successive oligopoly, with an oligopoly
of upstream gas producers and a downstream oligopoly of gas traders.3
Furthermore, natural gas consumption within the EU relies heavily on
supply from a small number of non-EU gas producing countries (Norway,
Russia and Algeria).4
The presence of imperfect competition in international markets may
provide trading countries with an incentive to use trade policy strategi-
cally in order to capture foreign rents.5 In the context of a successive
1See e.g. Greenhut and Ohta (1979) and Salinger (1988) for standard models of
successive Cournot oligopoly.
2The original EU Gas Directive from 1998 speciﬁed common rules for the trade,
distribution, supply and storage of natural gas. In 2003, an amendment to the direc-
tive included further measures to be taken in order to liberalise the European gas mar-
ket. Details can be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/gas/index_en.htm.
3Boots et al. (2004) model the European gas market as a successive Cournot
oligopoly. However, strategic policy issues are not looked into.
4See e.g. Austvik (1997), Radetzki (1999) and Percebois (1999) for detailed de-
scriptive analyses of the European natural gas market.
5Seminal contributions to the literature on strategic trade policy include Dixit
2international oligopoly industry, we analyse how the governments in the
exporting and importing countries may use taxes (or subsidies) strate-
gically in order to shift rents up or down the vertical value-chain. In
the basic version of our model — with only one exporting country — we
characterise the equilibrium of a non-cooperative policy game between
the upstream and downstream governments, and show that the equilib-
r i u mo u t c o m ed e p e n d sc r u c i a l l yo nt h er e l a t i v ed e g r e eo fc o n c e n t r a t i o n
in the upstream and downstream parts of the industry. We also extend
our basic model to allow for upstream supply from two diﬀerent coun-
tries, where the government in the second country may or may not act
strategically, which may also aﬀect the policy equilibrium in a non-trivial
way.
Although international trade agreements to a certain extent may
limit the availability of traditional trade policy instruments, such as
export subsidies and import tariﬀs, there is arguably a wide range of
feasible policy instruments that may be used for strategic trade pur-
poses. For example, a country may adopt lax environmental policies —
as a substitute for direct subsidies — in order to strengthen the com-
petitive position of domestic ﬁrms vis-á-vis their foreign rivals.6 In our
model, we let the policy instrument be a tax (or subsidy) on production
in the respective countries, which can be given several diﬀerent inter-
pretations.7 In any case, the important feature of the model is that
national policy makers can use tax instruments of one or another kind
to aﬀect equilibrium market prices, and thus the allocation of industry
rents between the countries.8
(1984), Brander and Spencer (1985) and Eaton and Grossman (1986).
6Seminal contributions to the literature on ‘strategic environmental policy’ include
Conrad (1993), Barrett (1994) and Kennedy (1994).
7For example, in our model (with no domestic consumption in the exporting
countries), an upstream tax on production is equivalent to an export tax, while a
downstream production tax is equivalent to an import tariﬀ levied on the domestic
ﬁrms. It is also worth noting that a consumption tax would have similar qualitative
eﬀe c t sa sa ni m p o r tt a r i ﬀ.
8In the natural gas example, there is also another policy instrument that may
be used strategically in order to extract foreign rents. A key component in the
process of liberalising the European gas market is the concept of ‘third-party access’
(TPA) to gas piplines and transmission networks, where all players have access to the
transportation systems on equal non-discriminatory conditions. Since the exporting
3We also analyse how the degree of competition in diﬀerent parts of
t h ei n d u s t r yi sl i k e l yt oa ﬀect the policy equilibrium. This has impor-
tant implications for competition policy and welfare eﬀects of market
liberalisation. Given that policy makers act strategically, which country
will gain or lose from increased competition in either the upstream or
downstream part of the industry? For example, in the process of liber-
alising the European natural gas market, there is a stated desire from
the European Union not only to increase downstream competition, but
also to increase competition in the upstream market by trying to break
up the sales monopolies of the exporting countries.9,10 Although down-
stream ﬁrms may stand to lose, this should — in principle — yield a net
beneﬁt to the importing countries through increased supply and lower
prices. But will this necessarily be the case if the governments in the
importing and exporting countries engage in strategic trade policy? And
how is the presence of competing exporting countries likely to aﬀect the
results? These are some of the key questions analysed in the paper.
Let us now sketch some of our main ﬁndings. In our basic version of
the model, the non-cooperative policy equilibrium implies a positive up-
stream tax rate if there is any upstream competition, and a zero tax rate
otherwise. The equilibrium downstream tax rate, on the other hand, is
positive if, roughly speaking, the downstream market is more competi-
tive than the upstream market, and negative otherwise. This illustrates
the conﬂict of interest between the countries: whereas the government
in the exporting country is concerned about maximising upstream rev-
enue net of production costs, the government in the downstream country
and importing countries control diﬀerent parts of the transmission network, policy
makers may have incentives to set the regulated access price strategically, thereby
engaging in a regulatory competition game, in order to shift rents up or down the
value-chain. In this case, the access price is a de facto tax instrument.
9The major gas producer Norway — a non-EU country, but subject to the common
competition legislation in the European Economic Area (EEA) — reluctantly accepted
to dismantle the Norwegian gas sales monopoly (GFU) after threats of legal actions
by the EU Commission (see, e.g., Claes and Fossum, 2002).
10Golombek et al. (1998) use a numerical model of the Western European nat-
ural gas market to analyse supply-side responses to a more liberalised downstream
industry, and ﬁnd that producing countries have an incentive to break up their sales
monopolies. However, strategic trade policy, or any form of tax policy competition
between countries, is not an issue.
4must balance concerns for rent-extraction from the upstream part of the
industry (which requires a positive tax rate) and for stimulating compe-
tition in the downstream part of the industry (which requires a negative
tax rate). However, supply from a second exporting country introduces
an incentive for the upstream governments to subsidise domestic pro-
duction in order to capture market shares in the export market. In this
case, if both upstream governments act strategically, we show that pos-
itive upstream tax rates in both countries cannot be part of a policy
equilibrium.
Some of our most interesting results regard the welfare eﬀects of in-
creased competition in the diﬀerent parts of the vertically linked indus-
try. With a single exporting country (or cooperative upstream policy-
making), increased upstream competition will actually beneﬁtt h ee x -
porting country and harm the importing country in the trade policy
equilibrium. This has powerful implications for upstream competition
policy. By stimulating upstream competition, and instead use a tax in-
strument to restrict total supply to the downstream market, rents are
shifted up the value-chain, which beneﬁts the exporting country. A sim-
ilar result was shown by Cowan (1989) in a structurally simpler model,
but under more general demand assumptions.11 We extend Cowan’s
model by introducing a downstream oligopoly in the importing coun-
try and the possibility of a second exporting (upstream) country, both
of which inﬂuence policy incentives in non-trivial ways. We show that
the result is robust to the introduction of a second exporting country,
conditional on non-strategic behaviour by the the policy maker in this
country. However, if both upstream governments act strategically, and
non-cooperatively, the result is reversed, although increased competition
in both exporting countries might beneﬁtt h e s ec o u n t r i e si ns o m es p e c i a l
cases.
Increased downstream competition, on the other hand, is shown al-
ways to beneﬁt the importing country. However, contrary to the case
11In a model with oligopolist ﬁrms in a single exporting country selling directly to
consumers in an importing country, and with an export tax and an import tariﬀ as
the policy instruments, the equivalent result is shown to hold if demand is not too
convex.
5of free trade, upstream welfare might suﬀer. For example, if the good
is supplied from ﬁrms in two exporting countries, increased downstream
competition beyond a quite concentrated level reduces upstream wel-
fare. Thus, in the context of our natural gas example, even if the major
non-EU gas producers like Norway and Russia retain control over their
domestic competition policies, liberalisation of the downstream Euro-
pean gas market may aﬀect these exporting countries negatively.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the only paper that studies
policy competition between exporting and importing countries in suc-
cessive international oligopoly. Our analysis relates closely to several
strands of the international trade literature, though. The idea of using
some form of domestic taxation to extract rents from foreign exporters
with market power was ﬁrst presented by Katrak (1979), and has since
been elaborated on and extended in numerous papers.12 However, a
common feature in these papers is a lack of foreign policy response.13
Our paper also relates to a more recent body of contributions that
explicitly models a vertical industry structure with trade in intermedi-
ates within a context of strategic trade policy.14 However, these analyses
focus either on ﬁn a l - g o o d sc o m p e t i t i o ni nat h i r dm a r k e t—ál aB r a n d e r
and Spencer (1985) — or on domestic trade policy only, which makes
them quite diﬀerent from our study.15
12See, e.g., Brander and Spencer (1981, 1984), Bergstrom (1982), Brander and Dja-
jic (1983), Hillman and Templeman (1985) and Lahiri and Ono (1999). Raimondos-
Møller and Woodland (2000) derive similar results in a perfectly competitive context,
but where the trade policy game is characterised by a sequential structure.
13An important exception is Brander and Spencer (1984), who include foreign
policy in an analysis of optimal domestic tariﬀ policy for extracting rents from a
foreign oligopoly. However, the foreign policy instrument is taken to be the degree
of ‘cartelisation’ only, with the implication that complete cartelisation is the optimal
policy when foreign consumption of the good is negligible. However, by equipping
the foreign government with the power also to tax, the exact opposite conclusion is
reached.
14See, e.g., Spencer and Jones (1991, 1992), Ziss (1997), Bernhofen (1997), Ishikawa
and Lee (1997), Ishikawa and Spencer (1999) and Chang and Sugeta (2004).
15Of the aformentioned papers, Ishikawa and Lee (1997) and Ishikawa and Spencer
(1999) are perhaps the most closely related, in the sense that they consider a succes-
sive Cournot oligopoly similar to ours. However, besides the fact that these papers
consider domestic trade policy only, there is a marked diﬀerence from the present
paper in the types of international market structures that are analysed.
6Finally, the present paper makes a contribution to the literature on
the interplay between competition and trade policy. Much of this re-
search focus on the substitutability of strategic trade and merger poli-
cies, and the question of whether trade liberalisation will induce laxer
competition policies.16 We complement this literature by analysing the
interaction of diﬀerent policy incentives in vertically linked industries. A
novel ﬁnding is that strategic use of tax policies may increase the conﬂict
of interest, with respect to competition policies, between exporting and
importing countries.
2 The basic model
Consider an industry with two vertically related activities in two dif-
ferent countries. There are m independent (and identical) upstream
producers of a homogenous good in country U supplying n independent
(and identical) downstream distributors in country D, where the good
is consumed.17 We want to portray a situation where downstream ﬁrms
are dependent on key inputs from upstream suppliers in one or a few
countries, where domestic consumption (in the exporting countries) is
typically negligible, compared with the export volumes. Thus, to sim-
plify and keep the analysis clearly focused, we assume that there is no
consumption of the good in the exporting country.18
The ﬁrms compete à la Cournot at both stages of the value-chain.
In line with the received literature on successive Cournot oligopoly, we
assume that each downstream ﬁrm takes the wholesale price (as well as
the outputs of other downstream ﬁr m s )a sg i v e nw h e nc o m m i t t i n gt oa n
output quantity. As noted by Salinger (1988) and others, this amounts
to giving upstream producers a ﬁrst-mover advantage.
16In addition to the aforementioned paper by Cowan, important contributions
include Auquier and Caves (1979), Dixit (1984), Richardson (1999), Horn and Levin-
sohn (2001), Huck and Konrad (2004), De Stefano and Rysman (2004) and Saggi
and Yildiz (2004).
17Alternatively, we can think of the upstream activity as the production of a ho-
mogenous intermediate good which is transformed into a homogenous ﬁnal good by
downstream ﬁrms at constant marginal costs.
18In the context of the European natural gas market, this is actually a quite ac-
curate assumption for one of the largest gas producers, Norway, where domestic
consumption of natural gas is practically non-existent.
7Within this context, a role for strategic trade policy is created by
letting the governments in both countries use taxes (or subsidies) strate-
gically, in order to shift rents up or downwards in the value-chain. We
consider the following three-stage game:
Stage 1: the governments in U and D simultaneously and indepen-
dently commit to their preferred values of upstream and down-
stream taxes (subsidies), respectively.
Stage 2: the upstream ﬁrms simultaneously and independently commit
to the quantities supplied to the downstream market.
Stage 3: the downstream ﬁrms simultaneously and independently com-
mit to the quantities supplied to the ﬁnal consumers.
3 Market equilibrium
As usual, the game is solved by backwards induction.
Downstream
The market-clearing retail price is given by
p = a − Q, (1)
where Q :=
Pn
i=1 qi is the total output supplied by downstream dis-
tributors. Denoting the wholesale price by w,t h ep r o ﬁtf u n c t i o no fa





p − w − t
D¢
qi, (2)
where tD is a tax rate set by the government in country D.I n t h e
Cournot-Nash equilibrium, the output of each downstream ﬁrm is
qi =
a − w − tD
n +1
,i =1 ,...,n. (3)
8Upstream
Aggregating (3) and rearranging, we can derive the inverse demand
function facing the upstream ﬁrms. This is deﬁned as









j=1 xj is total output supplied by the upstream ﬁrms. As-
suming constant marginal costs of production, c,p r o ﬁts for an upstream







xj − cxj, (5)
where tU is a tax rate set by the government in country U.19





a − c − tD − tU¢
(m +1 )( n +1 )
,j =1 ,...,m. (6)
This yields an equilibrium total supply of
X = Q =
mn
¡
a − c − tD − tU¢
(m +1 )( n +1 )
, (7)
and equilibrium wholesale and retail prices given by, respectively,
w =
¡







(m + n +1 )a + mn
¡
c + tD + tU¢
(m +1 )( n +1 )
. (9)
Note that the structural richness of the model allows for diﬀerent
standard assumptions to appear as special cases. For example, m →
∞ implies that downstream ﬁrms source their inputs from a perfectly
competitive upstream market. In this case, the input (or wholesale)
price is simply given by w = c+tU. On the other hand, n →∞implies
that p = w + tD. In this case, our model is equivalent to a standard
19To ensure a positive supply of the good in equilibrium, we must require that
c<a .
9trade model with foreign exporters selling directly to consumers in the
importing country, where tD corresponds to an import tariﬀ.
3.1 Taxation and rent-shifting
Before solving for the policy equilibrium, it is instructive, though fairly
standard, to consider how taxation can be used to shift rents between
diﬀerent parts of the vertical value-chain. The eﬀects of taxation on
prices and output follow straightforwardly from (7)-(9). A higher down-
stream tax will induce downstream ﬁr m st or e d u c et h e i ro u t p u t s ,w h i c h
causes an increase in the ﬁnal price, p. However, such a tax increase
also spills over into the upstream part of the industry. A downstream
output contraction implies that the demand curve facing the upstream
producers shifts inward, causing the equilibrium wholesale price to de-
crease. Similarly, a higher upstream tax leads to a reduction of upstream
output, but part of such a tax increase spills over into the downstream
country through a higher wholesale price, causing also the retail price to
increase.
In eﬀect, downstream taxes are partly paid by upstream ﬁrms, whereas
upstream taxes are partly paid by downstream ﬁrms and consumers.
Conversely, a downstream subsidy will partly beneﬁtu p s t r e a mﬁrms,
and vice versa. An increase in either upstream or downstream taxes
will consequently reduce total output (and thus consumers’ surplus) and
proﬁts of both upstream and downstream ﬁrms. This is conﬁrmed by de-







a − c − tD − tU¢2
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2 (n +1 )






a − c − tD − tU¢2
(m +1 )
2 (n +1 )
2 ,i =1 ,...,n. (11)
104 Policy equilibrium
We make the standard assumption that national policy makers maximise
national welfare, deﬁned as the total surplus accruing to all agents situ-
ated in a given country. The objective functions of the governments in
























where CS = 1
2Q2 is consumers’ surplus.20
The ﬁrst-order conditions from the simultaneous maximisation prob-



















a − c − tU¢
2(n +1 )+mn
, (15)
From (14) it is clear that in the case of an upstream monopoly
(m =1 ), the optimal upstream tax rate is zero, irrespective of the
downstream tax policy. Otherwise, the equilibrium value of tU is pos-
itive. This reﬂects the terms-of-trade motive for upstream taxation.22
When there are more than one upstream ﬁrm, private incentives lead to
socially excessive output, from the viewpoint of upstream welfare, and
the government can induce outcomes closer to the cartel output by tax-
ing upstream production (or exports). We also see that ∂tU/∂tD < 0
for m>1. A lower downstream tax rate will reduce the wholesale price
20Since we allow for negative tax rates, this deﬁnition of welfare relies on an implicit
assumption that the governments are able to raise funds for subsidy payments in a
non-distortionary manner.
21The second-order conditions are satisﬁed for all possible parameter conﬁgura-
tions, ensuring that tU + tD <a− c in equilibrium.
22See also Dixit (1984) and Eaton and Grossman (1986).
11and trigger an upstream output expansion. Once more, though, each
upstream ﬁrm imposes a negative externality on the other ﬁrms when
expanding their output, causing an excessive response to the downstream
tax reduction. Thus, the optimal upstream policy response is a tax in-
crease.
The policy maker in the downstream country, on the other hand,
must balance two diﬀerent considerations when framing the optimal
policy. On the one hand, the government can extract some upstream
rents by imposing a positive downstream tax rate. On the other hand,
considerations for eﬃciency dictate that the government should use a
subsidy to stimulate downstream competition, thereby increasing con-
sumers’ surplus.
The rent-extraction eﬀect depends on the ability of the downstream
government to aﬀect the wholesale price, which, in turn, requires a cer-
tain degree of upstream market power. Increased competition in the
upstream part of the industry makes the wholesale price less sensitive to
changes in the downstream tax rate, which weakens the rent-extraction
motive for downstream trade policy.23 The eﬃciency motive, on the
other hand, is also determined by the degree of downstream competi-
tion. The lower the number of ﬁrms operating in the downstream mar-
ket, the stronger the incentives to reduce taxes (or increase subsidies)
in order to stimulate competition. Thus, the optimal balancing of the
rent-extraction and eﬃciency motives depends on the relative number
of upstream and downstream ﬁrms. From (15) we see that the rent-
extraction motive dominates if n+1>m , implying tD > 0,w h e r e a st h e
opposite is true for n +1<m . In the former case, we also observe that
upstream and downstream tax rates are strategic substitutes.
Simultaneously solving (14) and (15) yields the equilibrium expres-
sions for optimal tax rates,
t
U =
(m − 1)(n +1 )( a − c)
m + n +2 mn +1
, (16)
23F r o m( 8 )w eh a v et h a t∂w/∂tD = −1/(m +1 ) .
12t
D =
(1 + n − m)(a − c)
m + n +2 mn +1
. (17)
We summarise the characterisation of the policy equilibrium as follows:24
Proposition 1 (i) The equilibrium upstream tax rate is zero if m =
1, and positive otherwise. (ii) The equilibrium downstream tax rate is
positive (negative) if n +1> (<)m.
Furthermore, the comparative statics result for the equilibrium tax
rates are easily derived from (16)-(17):
Proposition 2 (i) ∂tU/∂n < (=)0 if m>(=)1,
(ii) ∂tU/∂m > 0,
(iii) ∂tD/∂n > 0,
(iv) ∂tD/∂m < 0.
The intuition for (ii)-(iv) follows directly from the above discussion.
Regarding (i), the decrease in the upstream tax rate due to increased
downstream competition (for m>1) is a strategic response to the in-
crease in downstream taxes when the eﬃciency motive for downstream
taxation is weakened.
5 Industry concentration and national welfare
How does increased competition in the upstream or downstream part
of the industry aﬀect national welfare when national policy makers act
strategically with respect to their tax policies? Before looking more
closely into this question, let us ﬁrst consider the laissez-faire policy as a
benchmark case. With tU = tD =0 , equilibrium expressions for national













m2n(n +2 )( a − c)
2
2(m +1 )
2 (n +1 )
2 , (19)
24The formal proofs of all Propositions throughout the paper are based on straight-
forward algebra and are thus not reported.

















Increased upstream competition reduces upstream proﬁts and bene-
ﬁts downstream ﬁrms (through a lower wholesale price) and consumers
(trough a lower retail price). Increased downstream competition, on
the other hand, beneﬁts both countries, in terms of national welfare.
Upstream ﬁrms beneﬁt due to increased demand from the downstream
market. Downstream proﬁts suﬀer, but this is more than outweighed by
an increase in consumers’ surplus.
Things change, though, if national policy makers use tax instruments
strategically. Applying (16)-(17), the equilibrium expressions for na-
tional welfare in the policy game are given by
W
U =
m2n(1 + n)(a − c)
2




mn(2(n +1 )+mn)(a − c)
2
2(m + n +2 mn +1 )
2 , (21)
from which we can derive the following result:
Proposition 3 (i) Increased upstream competition increases upstream
welfare and reduces downstream welfare, whereas (ii) increased down-
stream competition increases both upstream and downstream welfare.
The introduction of strategic trade policy leads to a surprising result
with respect to industry concentration in the upstream part of the indus-
try.26 Contrary to the benchmark case, increased upstream competition
actually beneﬁts the upstream country and harms the downstream coun-
try, in terms of social welfare. If we decompose the eﬀect of an increase
in m,w eﬁnd that upstream ﬁrms lose, while downstream ﬁrms and
25Technically, ∂WU
LF/∂m =( <)0 if m =( >)1. However, the integer restriction
on m means that welfare is reduced when increasing the number of upstream ﬁrms
f r o m1t o2 .
26As mentioned in the Introduction, this result mirrors Cowan (1989), who con-
siders a model that is equivalent to n →∞in our model.
14consumers beneﬁt, as in the benchmark case. What happens, though, is
that tax revenues are shifted upstream.
The intuition is related to the optimal tax responses to an increase in
upstream competition. An increase in the number of upstream suppliers
leads to increased upstream taxes, while downstream taxes are reduced.
As argued in the previous Section, an increase in m reduces the rent-
extraction motive for the downstream government, leading to a lower
downstream tax rate. Although total output increases, the possibility of
shifting rents downstream is reduced, and downstream welfare drops as a
consequence. Upstream welfare increases for the same reason. Increased
upstream competition means that less rents are shifted downwards in
the value-chain, while the upstream government optimally increases the
tax rate to correct for the negative competition externality.
This result is in sharp contrast to the notion that complete cartelisa-
tion is always beneﬁciary for an exporting country with no domestic con-
sumption of the good.27 The reason is simply that cartelisation has two
opposing eﬀects on upstream welfare. On the one hand, it reduces (or
eliminates) the negative competition externality, which is the intended
eﬀect. On the other hand, though, it increases the amount of rents avail-
able for extraction by downstream policy makers. To the extent that m
is a choice variable, it is better for the upstream government to increase
m — thereby reducing the scope for rent-extraction — and instead use
the tax instrument to indirectly regulate the upstream oligopoly. An
increase in m is optimally accompanied by an increase in tU,w h i c ht r i g -
gers a reduction in tD. We can think of this as the domestic, rather than
a foreign, government taxing away the domestic rents.
The welfare eﬀects of increased downstream competition, on the
other hand, are qualitatively the same as in the benchmark case. All
else equal, increased downstream competition spurs demand from the
downstream market, which beneﬁts upstream ﬁrms. However, an in-
crease in n also reduces the eﬃciency motive for downstream taxation,
implying that tD goes up, which reduces the wholesale price. The up-
stream policy maker optimally responds by reducing tU. Nevertheless,
27See, e.g., Brander and Spencer (1984).
15only downstream proﬁts suﬀer from an increase in downstream compe-
tition. Upstream proﬁts, consumers’ surplus and tax revenues in both
countries increase.
6 International upstream oligopoly
In this section we extend our analysis to consider the case where up-
stream suppliers are located in diﬀerent countries, which opens up for
additional policy incentives. For an upstream country, a potential ad-
verse eﬀect of increasing taxes is a loss of market share to foreign up-
stream competitors, which may reduce or eliminate the positive eﬀect of
increased upstream competition, as reported in Proposition 3.
In the following, we make the assumption that upstream suppliers
— which are identical in all respects but location — are located in two
diﬀerent countries, where m1 and m2 are the number of ﬁrms in coun-
tries U1 and U2, respectively. The corresponding tax rates are denoted
tU
1 and tU
2 . We will intermittently refer to U1 and U2 as the ‘domestic’
and ‘foreign’ upstream countries, respectively, and our focus is directed
towards the domestic part of the upstream market. We start out by con-
sidering the case where the foreign government (in country U2) does not
act strategically, and set tU
2 =0 . Afterwards, we include both upstream
governments in the policy game.
6.1 Market equilibrium
In the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, outputs by upstream ﬁrms in U1 and
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(m1 + m2 +1 )( n +1 )
,k =1 ,...,m2. (23)
Total quantity supplied in equilibrium is given by
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, (24)
16with corresponding wholesale and retail equilibrium prices given by
w =
a − tD +( m1 + m2)c + m1tU
1 + m2tU
2















(m1 + m2 +1 )( n +1 )
. (26)
6.2 Non-strategic behaviour by the foreign upstream
government
The policy game is similar to the one outlined in Section 4, except that
the policy makers in U1 and D now take into consideration how their
policy choices will aﬀect the strategic behaviour of upstream suppliers
in U2. Setting tU
2 =0 ,t h eﬁrst order-conditions from the simultaneous
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1
¤
[n +1− (m1 + m2)]
(m1 + m2)[2(n +1 )+n(m1 + m2)]
. (28)
Foreign upstream competition introduces a new dimension to the op-
timal choice of tU
1 , implying that the government in U1 must balance two
opposing considerations. In addition to the previous terms-of-trade mo-
tive for taxation, there is now a rent-shifting motive vis-á-vis the foreign
competitors. By subsidising production (or exports), the government in
U1 can induce the domestic ﬁrms to increase output. Since the ﬁrms’
choice variables are strategic substitutes, such a policy will shift rents
from foreign to domestic upstream ﬁrms.28 This eﬀect obviously puts a
downward pressure on the upstream tax rate. The optimal balancing of
the two motives for upstream taxation depends on the relative number
of ﬁr m si nU 1a n dU 2 .F r o m( 2 7 )w es e et h a tt h et e r m s - o f - t r a d em o t i v e
28This is just the ‘classic’ strategic trade policy argument from Brander and
Spencer (1985).
17dominates — implying a positive tax rate — if m1 >m 2 +1 .
Whether or not the optimal downstream policy implies a positive
tax rate, on the other hand, is only dependent on the total number of
foreign suppliers, relative to the number of downstream distributors. The
downstream government faces the same trade-oﬀ between rent-extraction
and market eﬃciency as before, and the optimal downstream tax rate is
positive if n +1>m 1 + m2.
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(2m2 +1 )[ n +1− (m1 + m2)](a − c)
m1 + n +3 m2 +2 m1n +4 m2n +2 m1m2n +2 m2
2n +1
. (30)
Summarising the above analysis, the policy equilibrium is charac-
terised as follows:
Proposition 4 With non-strategic behaviour by the foreign upstream
government,
(i) tU
1 > (<)0if m1 > (<)m2 +1 ,
(ii) tD > (<)0if n +1> (<)m1 + m2.
It is also straightforward to verify — by comparing (16) and (29) —
that the presence of ‘foreign’ upstream suppliers reduces the optimal
upstream tax rate for all values of m2,d u et ot h ee x p o r tm a r k e tr i v a l r y
between the exporting countries.
From (29)-(30) we can also derive the comparative statics result for
the equilibrium tax rates:
Proposition 5 With non-strategic behaviour by the foreign upstream
government,
(i) ∂tU
1 /∂n < (>)0if m1 > (<)m2 +1 ,
(ii) ∂tU
1 /∂m1 > 0,
(iii) ∂tD/∂n > 0,
(iv) ∂tD/∂m1 < 0.
18The intuition for (ii)-(iv) follows from previous analysis and discus-
sion. The new feature introduced by foreign upstream competition is
that the equilibrium upstream tax rate can now be an increasing func-
tion of n. T h i si st h ec a s ei fm1 <m 2 +1 , which implies that the
equilibrium upstream tax rate is negative. Once more, this is a strategic
response to changes in the downstream tax rate. When tU
1 < 0,e x p o r t
market rivalry is the dominant force in determining domestic upstream
tax policy. An increase in downstream competition implies an increase of
the downstream tax rate, which reduces the wholesale price, and thereby
the proﬁtability of supplying the export market. This reduces the incen-
tives for using upstream subsidies to capture downstream market shares,
and the optimal upstream subsidy in U1 is correspondingly reduced.
Industry concentration and welfare
Since upstream competition between diﬀerent exporting countries
puts a downward pressure on upstream taxes, one might conjecture that
the positive relationship between upstream competition and welfare — as
reported in Proposition 3 — will be reversed, since this result relies on
the upstream government’s ability to increase taxation as a response to
increased upstream competition.
Using (29)-(30), equilibrium expressions for social welfare in U1 and
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From (31)-(32) we can easily derive the welfare eﬀects of increased
competition:
19Proposition 6 With non-strategic behaviour by the foreign upstream
government,
(i) ∂WU
1 /∂m1 > 0,
(ii) ∂WD/∂m1 < 0,
(iii) ∂WU
1 /∂n > (<)0if n<(>)n := m1+3m2+1
2m2(m1+m2−1)−1,
(iv) ∂WD/∂n > 0.
Parts (i)-(ii) of the Proposition conﬁrms that the presence of foreign
upstream suppliers does not qualitatively change the welfare eﬀects of
increased upstream competition that were derived in the previous Sec-
tion. As before, increased competition in the domestic upstream market
leads to higher taxes upstream and lower downstream, with the resulting
eﬀect that tax revenues are shifted up the value-chain. Even though for-
eign upstream competition puts a downward pressure on upstream taxes,
the lack of policy response (by assumption) from the foreign exporting
country ensures that the positive (negative) correspondence between up-
stream competition and upstream (downstream) welfare remains.
However, increased downstream competition might now harm up-
stream welfare. From part (iii) of the Proposition, we see that this is
the case if the number of downstream ﬁrms is above a critical level n
≤ 5.29 This is due to the policy response of the government in the im-
porting country.30 Higher downstream competition has two opposing
eﬀects on upstream welfare: it increases demand from the downstream
market, which beneﬁts upstream ﬁrms, but it also induces a downstream
tax increase, which has the opposite eﬀect. The total eﬀect on upstream
welfare depends thus on the relative strength of these two eﬀects. If
the domestic exporting country is the single supplier of the good to
the downstream market, we have demonstrated that the ﬁrst eﬀect al-
ways dominates. However, competition from a second exporting country
puts a downward pressure on upstream taxes, which increases upstream
29Since n is monotonically increasing in m1 and m2, it follows that n ≤ 5 for all
permissible values of m1 and m2.
30It can easily be shown that, with non-strategic behaviour by the downstream
government, increased downstream competition will always beneﬁtt h ee x p o r t i n g
countries.
20rents and thus the incentive for rent-extracting taxation in the import-
ing country.31 Consequently, the downstream tax response to increased
competition in the downstream market is stronger when the good is sup-
plied from two exporting countries. If n gets suﬃciently large, this is
enough make the overall eﬀect on upstream welfare negative.
6.3 Strategic behaviour by both upstream govern-
ments
Let us now consider the case where also the foreign upstream government
acts strategically, and chooses tU
2 to maximise the total surplus accru-
i n gt oc o u n t r yU 2 . I nt h i sc a s e ,t h em o d e lb o i l sd o w nt oas t a n d a r d
third-market model of strategic trade policy, with the added features of
downstream ﬁrms and an active government in the ‘third market’.
The ﬁrst-order conditions of the policy game deﬁne the best response
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¢
2m2 (m1 +1 )
, (34)
which illustrate that the aforementioned trade-oﬀ between the terms-of-
trade and the rent-shifting motives for upstream taxation now applies
equally to both upstream countries. Once more, the optimal balancing of
these two considerations is determined by the relative number of ﬁrms
in the two countries. The best-response functions reveal that positive
upstream taxes in both countries cannot be part of any policy equilibrium.
With an equal number of ﬁrms in both countries, the rent-shifting motive
always dominates, implying that the optimal upstream policies entail
subsidies. An increase in the number of ﬁr m si no n eo ft h eu p s t r e a m
countries will strengthen the terms-of-trade motive in this country, but
increase the rent-shifting incentive in the other country, implying that
positive taxes in both countries cannot be an equilibrium.
31This can be seen directly from the best-response function of the downstream
policy maker, (28).










(1 + n − (m1 + m2))[(m1 + m2)(a − c) − m1t1 − m2t2]
(m1 + m2)[2(n +1 )+( m1 + m2)n]
,
(35)
reveal that the trade-oﬀ between rent-extraction and market eﬃciency
is similar to the previous versions of the model, with the exact same
condition for a positive downstream tax rate as before.




(mi + mj)(mi − mj − 1)(n +1 )( a − c)
mi (2(n +1 )+( mi + mj)[2(2n +1 )+( mi + mj)n])
, (36)
i,j =1 ,2,i 6= j, and
t
D =
(m1 + m2 +2 )[ 1+n − (m1 + m2)](a − c)
2(n +1 )+( m1 + m2)[2(2n +1 )+( m1 + m2)n]
. (37)
The above discussion is summarised by the following characterisation of
the policy equilibrium:
Proposition 7 (i) If mi = mj,t h e ntU
i = tU
j < 0.
(ii) If mi = mj +1 ,t h e ntU
j <t U
i =0 .
(iii) If mi >m j +1 ,t h e ntU
j < 0 <t U
i .
Once more, the comparative statics results with respect to equilib-
rium taxes are easily derived from (36)-(37):
Proposition 8 (i) ∂tU
i /∂mi > (<)0if mi < (>)m,w h e r em>m j +1,
(ii) ∂tU
j /∂mi < 0,
(iii) ∂tD/∂mi < 0,
(iv) ∂tU
i /∂n < (>)0if mi > (<)mj +1 ,
(v) ∂tD/∂n > 0.
Compared with the previous versions of the model, the new results
regard the upstream tax responses to increased upstream competition.
Starting from a monopoly situation in country i (mi =1 ), increased com-
petition will induce the government in this country to increase taxes, as
22before. However, if mi gets very large the upstream tax rate will eventu-
ally start converging to zero from above. With a perfectly competitive
upstream market in country i (i.e., mi →∞ ), the equilibrium wholesale
p r i c ei sg i v e nb yw = c+tU
i . Consequently, a positive tax rate in country
i would drive the ﬁr m si nt h i sc o u n t r yo u to fb u s i n e s s .
The most important new result is stated in part (ii) of the Propo-
sition, though, which shows that increased competition in an upstream
country will always provoke a tax reduction from the competing up-
stream country. The more competitive the upstream market in country
i is, the more eﬀective is the use of tax instruments by the rivaling
country j to inﬂuence the equilibrium share of the export market served
by this country.32 In other words, the higher is mi relative to mj,t h e
stronger is the rent-shifting motive, relative to the terms-of-trade motive,
for taxation in country j. Thus, the optimal policy response from coun-
try j to an increase in mi,i st oi m p r o v et h ed o m e s t i cﬁrms’ competitive
position in the export market by reducing the tax rate, tU
j . This result
has important implications for the welfare eﬀects of increased upstream
c o m p e t i t i o n ,a sw ew i l ls eb e l o w .
Industry concentration and welfare






2 (mj +1 )( n +1 )n(a − c)
2
(2(n +1 )+( mi + mj)[2(2n +1 )+( mi + mj)n])
2, (38)
i,j =1 ,2,i 6= j, and
W
D =
(mi + mj +2 )
2 (mi + mj)[2(n +1 )+( mi + mj)n]n(a − c)
2
2(2(n +1 )+( mi + mj)[2(2n +1 )+( mi + mj)n])
2 .
(39)
The relationship between industry concentration and welfare in the dif-
ferent parts of the vertical industry is outlined in the ﬁnal Proposition
of the paper:
32This is easily conﬁrmed by using (22)-(23) to calculate how tax reductions inﬂu-
ence relative market shares in equilibrium.
23Proposition 9 (i) ∂WU
i /∂mi < 0,
(ii) ∂WU
j /∂mi > (<)0if mi > (<) b m,w h e r eb m<m j.
(iii) ∂WD/∂mi > 0,
(iv) ∂WU
i /∂n > (<)0if n<(>)b n :=
2(m1+m2+1)
(m1+m2)2−2,
(v) ∂WD/∂n > 0.
From part (i) of the Proposition we see that the previous relation-
ship between competition and welfare in the upstream market is now
reversed. This is due to the policy competition between the export-
ing countries, and closely related to part (ii) of Proposition 8. When
the governments in both exporting countries act strategically, increased
upstream competition in country i triggers a tax reduction in the com-
peting upstream country, with a subsequent reduction in export market
shares, and thus welfare, in country i.
However, increased competition in one exporting country might in-
crease welfare in the other exporting country, as part (ii) of the Propo-
sition suggests.33 This raises the question of whether the previously
derived positive relationship between upstream competition and welfare
might be restored — even in the case of policy competition between ri-
valing exporting countries — if we consider a simultaneous liberalisation
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Φ =2( 4+mi +5 mj)(n +1 )+( mi + mj)
2 [2 + n(mi − 3mj)].
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´
(n +1 )> 0.
We see that mi ≥ mj is a suﬃcient (but not necessary) condition for ∂WU
i /∂mj > 0.
24An exporting country will lose from increased competition in its own
country, but gain from increased competition in the rivaling upstream
country. The net gain is determined by the sign of Φ, which is ambigu-
ous. In general, we see that country i will always beneﬁt from increased
competition in both upstream markets if mi is, and remains, suﬃciently
larger than mj, which suggests that only one country — if any at all —
will stand to gain. This is also generally the case, although numerical
simulations suggest that both countries might beneﬁt if the degree of
concentration is, and remains, at a very high level.34
Finally, we can observe — from part (iv) of Proposition 9 — that the
potential for exporting countries being adversely aﬀected by a more com-
petitive downstream market is reinforced, compared with the analysis in
Section 6.2. Now, increased downstream competition will hurt export-
ing countries if the number of downstream ﬁr m si sl a r g e rt h a nb n ≤ 3.
Strategic trade policy by both exporting countries puts an additional
downward pressure on upstream taxes, which reinforces the incentive
for rent-extracting taxation in the importing country, implying that the
downstream tax response to increased downstream competition is even
stronger than in the previous cases. This consequently increases the
likelihood that a more competitive downstream market will hurt the
exporting countries.
7C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In this paper we have presented a comprehensive analysis of tax pol-
icy competition between exporting and importing countries in verti-
cally linked industries, using a model of successive international Cournot
oligopoly, with a particular emphasis on how the degree of concentra-
tion in the diﬀerent parts of the industry aﬀects the distribution of rents
among the countries. Here we will not recapitulate all results of the
paper, but rather provide some ﬁnal thoughts and elaborations on a
34For the special case of m1 = m2, numerical simulations seem to conﬁrm that
going from one to two ﬁrms in each exporting country increases welfare in both,
whereas an increase from two to three is only beneﬁcial if there is a downstream
monopoly (n =1 ). An increase in the number of ﬁrms beoynd three in each country
is not beneﬁcial for any of the exporting countries.
25couple of our main ﬁndings regarding the welfare eﬀects of increased
competition in the industry.
Elaborating on and extending a similar result in the previous lit-
erature, we have shown that a more competitive upstream market can
beneﬁt an exporting (upstream) country, while hurting the importing
(downstream) country. In our model, this result holds even in the case of
supply from a second exporting country, providing that the government
in this country acts non-strategically. When both upstream governments
engage in strategic trade policy, though, the result is generally reversed,
although increased competition in both upstream countries might beneﬁt
both exporting countries in a few special cases. If the exporting countries
were able perfectly to collude on their tax policies, though, we would ef-
fectually be back in the equilibrium of the basic model, with supply from
a single exporting country. This has some interesting implications with
respect to, for example, the optimal strategy of an international cartel
l i k eO P E C .T ot h ee x t e n tt h a tat a xr e s p o n s ef r o mi m p o r t i n gc o u n -
t r i e sc a nb es p u r r e d ,i tm i g h tb em o r ei m p o r t a n t( i . e . ,p r o ﬁtable) for
the OPEC countries to coordinate their tax policies, rather than their
export volumes.
We also ﬁnd that a more competitive downstream industry may in
fact hurt exporting countries when policy makers act strategically. In
our particular model, in the case of strategic behaviour by all involved
countries, this will be always happen whenever the number of domes-
tic ﬁrms exceeds three. This result suggests that the use of strategic
trade policy is likely to increase the conﬂict of interest, with respect to
competition policies, between exporting and importing countries. In the
case referred to above, the conﬂict of interest is close to complete: the
importing country would like to stimulate competition in all parts of
the industry, whereas the exporting countries have generally the exact
opposite interests.
Finally, we should emphasise that, in order to increase the richness of
our analysis, relative to the received literature, generality of functional
forms has to a certain extent been sacriﬁced to the beneﬁto fh i g h e r
structural generality. Thus, we cannot claim a high degree of generality
26for all of our results. We do, however, believe that the main mechanisms
at work apply to a wider class of demand and cost functions than the
linear speciﬁcations. Besides, in the cases where opposing forces pro-
duce ambiguous results, these will obviously persist under more general
demand and cost assumptions.
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